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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RES JUDICATA
In a recent case, Citizens Savings and Loan Association,
Belleville v. Knight,* defendant-appellee, Edgemont Savings
and Loan Association, filed an application to organize a savings
and loan association in the East St. Louis area in July of 1960.
The application was denied, and upon appeal the denial was affirmed by the Circuit Court.' Defendant re-applied to the Director of Financial Institutions two years later. Upon hearing by
the Director, a permit to organize was issued.
Plaintiffs-appellants, thirteen savings and loan associations, made complaints for a hearing as provided for by the
Savings and Loan Act. 2 The Director, upon hearing the complaints, affirmed his decision granting the permit. Thereafter,
in accordance with the Administrative Review Act,8 plaintiffs
appealed to the Circuit Court, which affirmed the Director's decision. Plaintiffs appealed further to the Appellate Court contending that the ruling on the first application, and its subsequent affirmance by the Circuit Court, was res judicata as to the
second application approved and affirmed by the Director. The
court held that the prior decision of the Director was not res
4

judicata.

It is apparent from the language quoted and the authorities
cited that the court based its decision upon a broad rule that
the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to administrative
bodies. Some Illinois cases, the opinions of which contain language to this effect, were cited. In Illinois Power and Light
CorporationV. Commerce Commission,5 the court, holding that
an order previously entered by the agency was subject to change,
stated: "The commission is not a judicial tribunal and its orders
* 74 Ill. App. 2d 234, 219 N.E. 2d 355 (1966).
App. 2d 416,
'Industrial Savings and Loan Association v. Knight, 67 Ill.
214 N.E. 2d 910 (1966).
2 LLL. REv. STAT. (1965), ch. 32, §860.
Proceedings on Objections to Commissioner's Action. Except as otherwise specifically provided by this Act, any person who deems himself
aggrieved by any decision, order, or action of the Commissioner may
receive a hearing ...
8 ILL. REV. STAT. (1965), ch. 110, § 268. "Jurisdiction to review final
administrative decisions is vested in the Circuit Courts." §276 provides:
"Any final decision, order, judgment or decree of the Circuit Court entered
in an action to review a decision of an administrative agency may be reviewed by the Appellate Court .... "
4The court also found that the order of the director approving the
application was supported by sufficient findings and was not contrary to the
manifest weight of the evidence.
5320 Ill. 427, 151 N.E. 236 (1926).
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In Mississippi River Fuel CorporationV.

Commerce Commission,7 the court said: "The commission, however, is not a judicial body, and its orders are not res judicata

in later proceedings before it. '' 8 Likewise, in Daley v. License
Appeal Commission,9 the court said:
A prior determination of an administrative body is not res judiAn administrative
cata in subsequent proceedings before it ....
review agency has the power to deal freely with each situation that
comes before it regardless of how it may have dealt0 with a similar
or even the same situation in a previous proceeding.'

Summarizing these holdings, the court in the Citizens Savings
and Loan case cited and quoted from Illinois Law and Practice:

"A determination of an administrative body is not res judicata
in subsequent proceedings even though such a body was acting
in its judicial capacity in making the determination."'"
Without regard to the correctness of the decision in the
Citizens Savings and Loan case, the question remains whether
the doctrine of res judicata, distinctively judicial in origin, does

have an area of operation in the field of administrative law and
procedure.

Administrative agencies are not the judiciary, yet

they frequently exercise powers which are judicial in nature.
RES JUDICATA IN THE COURTS

The doctrine of res judicata originated as a Roman concept,
but the term itself did not find its way into English law until

after Blackstone. 9
As the modern courts have defined it, the doctrine requires
that an adjudication by a court of competent jurisdiction be considered finally and conclusively settled regarding any subsequent
6 Id. 320 I1. at 431, 151 N.E. at 237. The court stated that in a case such
as this, dealing with a request for a certificate of convenience and necessity,
the Commerce Commission could re-evaluate and enlarge the appellees' area
of service when changed conditions warrant it.
7 1 Ill. 2d 509, 116 N.E. 2d 394 (1953).
8 Id., 1 Ill. 2d at 513, 116 N.E. 2d at 396. This case involved a company
which sold natural gas to industrial users. In a prior proceeding, the commission had held that the company was not acting as a public utility. Subsequent
to that, it re-examined the facts and held that the company was acting in
the capacity of a public utility and, therefore, subject to regulation governing public utilities. The court stated that res judicata did not apply to such
administrative proceedings, but reviewing the facts upon appeal, held that
the company was not acting as a public utility.
9 55 Ill. App. 2d 474, 205 N.E. 2d 269 (1965).
'o Id., 55 Ill. App. 2d at 477, 205 N.E. 2d at 272. This case involved the
determination of the good moral character of the liquor license applicant.
Although the court commented upon the effect of res judicata in administrative proceedings, it held the question moot, in that the applicant withdrew
his application upon appeal.
"1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE, ch. 2, §30.
12 Parker, Administrative Res Judicata,40 ILL. L. REv. 56 (1945).
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litigation where the same question arises between the same parties in a court of concurrent jurisdiction."
Neither the parties to an action nor persons in privity with them
can re-litigate any fact or question actually or directly in issue in
such suit which was passed upon and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, but where the former adjudication is relied
on as a bar to a subsequent action it is essential that
there shall be
4
identity both of the subject matter and the parties.
With respect to the function and policy interest served by

the application of the res judicata doctrine, it has been stated
that there is no maxim of the law more firmly established or of
more value in the administration of justice than that which is
designed to prevent repeated litigation between the same parties

in regard to the same issues on substantially the same facts.
"Public policy dictates that there be an end of litigation; that
those who have contested an issue shall be bound by the result
of the contest, and that matters once tried shall be considered
forever settled as between such parties."' 15
The desire to eliminate the uncertainty that can be caused
by the lack of finality in litigation has also added support for the
adoption of the doctrine of res judicata. It is essential in a modern, economically oriented society to be able to rely on decisions

of courts in order to further economic stability; particularly with
respect to matters affecting security of title and free marketability of land. When liability is established and damages are
assessed, parties should be able to make financial arrangements
to pay these judgments without the fear that they will later be
assessed a larger amount.16 Reference to the doctrine by the
Supreme Court of the United States has been in terms of "the
salutary influence which it exerts in giving permanence to estab13 People ex rel. Graff v. C. B. & Q. R. R. Co., 247 Ill. 340, 93 N.E. 422

(1910).

14 Id., 249 Ill. at 343, 93 N.E. at 423. It is doubtful that any case has ever
gone as far as holding anything res judicata short of this: "if such a decision
should be found, it would be violative of plain legal principles, and would
not be authoritative." Wadsworth v. Connell. 104 Ill. 369, 374 (1882). "A
verdict not confirmed by judgment does not constitute estoppel or res judicata." Stubbing v. Durham, 210 11. 542, 551, 71 N.E. 586 (1904).
See
The People ex rel. David Williams v. The Board of Education of Pawnee
Township High School, 350 Ill. 597, 601; 183 N.E. 633, 634 (1932). The
court in this case said:
[A] judgment cannot be pleaded in bar of a subsequent action unless it
is a final judgment on the merits, adjudicating the rights in litigation
in a conclusive and definite manner.
For a discussion on the necessity of having the same parties in the second
action for the application of collateral estoppel see generally, Comment,
Developments in the Law - Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REV. 820, 861-865
(1952). See also Lynch v. Chicago Transit Authority, 62 Il. App. 2d 220,
210 N.E. 2d 792 (1965).
15 Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Association, 283 U.S. 522,
525 (1931).
16 Comment, Developments in the Law - Res Judicata,65 HARV. L. REV.
820, 827 (1952).
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lished rights, in putting an end to angry contests, and preserving tranquillity in society," along with the characterization of it7
as "one of the most beneficial principles of our jurisprudence."1
But the courts have also recognized another aspect of public
policy which calls for greater flexibility in the application of this
doctrine Where the public has a direct concern in the litigation.
Thus, in Mercoid Corporationv. Mid-Continent Investment Company1 8 the Supreme Court held that failure to assert in a prior
suit a separate statutory cause of action, such as one for damages under the Clayton Antitrust Act, which might have been
asserted as a counterclaim therein, did not render the judgment
in such suit res judicata as to it. The court said that in this
area the determination of the policy was not "dependent on the
usual rules governing the settlement of private litigation."' 9
Referring to the greater latitude of discretion exercised by
equity courts, in furtherance of the public interest, rather than
when only private interests are involved, the court said: "The
parties cannot foreclose the courts from the exercise of that disfailure to interpose the same defense in an earlier
cretion by 2the
0
litigation.
RES JUDICATA IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

It would seem, at the outset, that these same forceful reasons;
i.e., that no one should be vexed more than once for the same
cause, that permanence should attach to established rights, and
that the order of society should not be disturbed by repeated
litigation; should have the same standing in administrative proceedings as they have traditionally been accorded by the judiciary.
But administrative agencies are not courts. Their function
may be ministerial, legislative or judicial.21 Clearly, if their
function is not judicial the doctrine of res judicata has no application. The point at which an act of an administrative
agency is judicial for purposes of res judicata is, at best, difficult to discern. This difficulty stems in part from the nature
17Aurora City v. West, 7 Wall. 82, 105, 106 (1882) (dissenting opinion). The dissenting opinion recognized, as did the majority, the significance
and importance of the doctrine of res judicata in our judicial system but disagreed as to its application in this case.
Is320 U.S. 661 (1943).

19 Id., at 670.
20Id. See also Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322,
329 (1955).
21 The granting or revoking of an automobile license may be merely
ministerial acts; i.e., the carrying out of an act or duty prescribed by a law
without the exercise of personal judgment or discretion. Regulation to supplement litigation is legislative. See 2 F. Cooper, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 510 (1965).
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of administrative agencies which were designed to administer
the details of an expanding body of law and22 to adjust this law
to meet the demands of a changing society.
To determine whether an act of an administrative agency
is judicial, according to Harden v. City of Raleigh,23 the formal
manner or means by which the power is exercised must be ascertained. If the agency's decision requires the investigation of
facts, the drawing of conclusions and the exercise of discretion
analogous to that of the24 courts, such determination would be
characterized as judicial.

On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court emphasized, in addition, the functional nature of the power exercised. 25 This view was controlling in the leading case of Prentis
v. Atlantic Coast Line Co. 26 The Virginia state constitution established a state corporation commission and defined its powers
at length. It exercised the authority of the state to regulate
public service corporations. Pursuant thereto, the commission
entered an order fixing maximum rates to be charged by Virginia railroads. This order was challenged by a bill in equity,
seeking an injunction against its enforcement. By way of defense, the Commission asserted that their decision as to the
legality of the rate was final under the doctrine of res judicata,
and not subject to re-examination. The Supreme Court held
otherwise. Justice Holmes writing for the court said it was
plain that the proceedings drawn in question were legislative in
their nature,
. and none the less so that they had taken place with a body
which at another moment, or in its principle or dominant aspect, is
a court ....

A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and endorses

22 Parker, Administrative Law, 18 (1952). See Berle, The Expansion
of American Administrative Law, 30 HARv. L. REv. 430 (1917) ; Frankfurter,
The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. OF PA. L. REv., 614 (1927). Licensing
boards and officials, like all administrative agencies, are the product of necessity. Increased regulation and taxation have forced their development and
growth. They seem to be the only efficient method by which to handle the
maze of detail created by the regulation and taxation of countless different
occupations and businesses. The extent of their powers is only limited by
the extent of the power of their creator and the doctrine of separation of
powers. Mortimer and Dunne, Grant and Revocation of Licenses, 1957 ILL.
L. FORUM 28.

192 N.C. 395, 135 S.E. 151 (1926).
1d., 192 N.C. at 397, 135 S.E. at 152.
wherein the
25 See, e.g., Pearson v. Williams, 202 U.S. 281 (1906),
Supreme Court held that the Secretary of Commerce and Labor might direct
a second hearing before a board of special inquiry, looking to the deportation
of certain aliens, although the first decision of the board of inquiry at the
time of their landing was unanimously in their favor. Speaking for the
court, Justice Holmes said the board "is an instrument of executive power,
not a court," made up of subordinates of the commissioner of immigration,
whose duties were declared by statute to be administrative. Id., at 284,
285.
26 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
23

24
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liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws
supposed already to exit. That is its purpose and end. Legislation
on the other hand looks to the future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some
part of those subject to its power. The establishment of a rate is
the making of a rule for the future, and therefore is an act legislative not judicial in kind ....
Proceedings legislative in nature are
not proceedings in a court . . . no matter what may be the general
2
or dominant character of the body in which they may take place. 1

Once the court determines that the action of the agency is not

a judicial function, the doctrine of res judicata is not a bar to
any subsequent re-examination on the part of the agency. 28

But

once it has been determined that the agency is acting in a judicial function, the court must then consider the application of
the doctrine.
However, even after it is ascertained that the administrative agency is performing a judicial function, the application of
the doctrine of res judicata results in a degree of asymmetry
when compared to its application to the judicial acts of the
courts. These difficulties in adapting judicial techniques and
concepts to the administrative process, often more apparent than
real, were pointed out by Justice Frankfurter in Federal Com29
munications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Company.
In the course of his opinion he stated that the procedural rules
which develop from the interrelationship of judicial tribunals
are out of place when strictly applied to define the extent of control to which legislative power, exercised through a delegated
agency, is subjected30 He went on to say:
Courts, like other organisms, represent an interplay of form and
function. The history of Anglo-American Courts and the more or
less narrowly defined range of their staple business have determined the basic characteristics of trial procedure, the rules of evidence, and the general principles of appellate review. Modern administrative tribunals are the outgrowth of conditions far different

27 Id., at 226.
But see Schopflocher, Doctrine of Res Judicatain Administrative Law, 1942 Wisc. L. REV. 5, 39, 40.
28 See, e.g., Mulcahy v. Public Service Commission, 101 Utah 245, 117
P. 2d 298 (1941), wherein the court held that where there is no inherent
right in controversy there is no exercise of the judicial function and, therefore, there could be no final and conclusive determination of the rights or
issues therein involved and decided by it. The court allowed a trucking
company, whose application for certificate of convenience and necessity to
operate as a common motor carrier in a certain territory had been denied,
to reapply and be granted a certificate on facts similar to those existing at
the time of the order denying the first application. In holding that the Public Service Commission did not act in a "quasi-judicial" manner the court,
following Holmes' decision in Prentis, said:
The test is: Was the particular decision judicial in its nature and
effect? The measuring rod, the test to be applied in determining this
question, is not to be found in the mechanics of the proceeding. The
mere fact that hearings are had, evidence taken, and decision rendered
thereon, does not make the decision a judicial one. The power test is the
functional one. Id., 101 Utah at 255, 117 P. 2d at 302.
29 309 U.S. 134 (1940).
20 Id., at 141.
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from those. To a large degree they have been a response to the felt
need of governmental supervision over economic enterprise - a
supervision which could effectively be exercised neither directly
through self-executing legislation nor by the judicial processA1
Justice Frankfurter further commented that administrative
agencies, unlike courts, have the power of initiating their own
inquiry, or, when their authority is invoked, of controlling the
scope and development of the investigation in order to ascertain
what the public interest demands. Thus greater latitude is essential to enable the administrative agency to minister to the
expanded needs of the public in the use of the available facilities
for transportation, communication and other essential public services.3 2 "These differences in origin and function preclude wholesale transplantation of the rules of procedure, trial, and review
which have evolved from the history and experience of courts,"
3
he concluded. 3
The difference in the respective natures of administrative
agencies and the courts does not itself entirely eliminate or displace the application of the doctrine of res judicata to administrative determinations. To the extent that finality and stability
are feasible, the doctrine of res judicata still has utility. The
New York Court of Appeals in Evans v. Monaghan,3 reviewing
an administrative order suspending policemen from the New
York police force, said:
Security of person and property requires that determinations in the
field of administrative law should be given as much finality as is
reasonably possible . .. [T]he rule of res judicata is applicable to
such determinations as well as to the courts wherever consistent
with the purposes of the tribunal, board or officer . . . Such departures from the rule as there may be in administrative law appear to spring from the peculiar necessities of the particular case
of the nature of the precise power being exercised, rather than
from any general distinction between courts and administrative
tribunals .... 3.1
In areas where the proceeding involves a more static situation without change of circumstances, such as awards of money
damages in workmen's compensation cases, the doctrine of res
judicata is strongly applicable. The acceptance of this view in
the area of workmen's compensation is exemplified by the decision in the case of Trigg v. IndustrialCommission/6 in which the
court said that the function of the Industrial Commission is
81 Id.,

at 142.
Id., at 143.
88 Id.
34306 N.Y. 312, 118 N.E. 2d 452 (1954).
35 Id., 306 N.Y. at 323, 324; 118 N.E. 2d at 457, 458.
56 364 Ill. 581, 5 N.E. 2d 394 (1936).
82
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closely akin to a judicial proceeding, and applied the doctrine of
7
res judicata
In the case of Little v. Board of Adjustment of City of Raleigh,88 the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that once the
Board of Adjustment denied a construction permit, the applicant
was not entitled to a new hearing on such application where the
facts were identical to those in the record of the board's initial
refusalA5 It would also seem that the same reasoning should
preclude an agency from revoking a license when there has been
no change of circumstances or where the public interest has not
40
been affected.
87 The daughter of a deceased worker attempted to have Workmen's
Compensation payments, originally granted to her mother, paid to her after
her mother remarried. In the original claim the wife of the deceased was
found to be the only dependent. This finding by the Commission in the original proceeding was held to be res judicata as to this later claim by the
daughter. See Centralia Coal Company v. Industrial Commission, 297 Ill.
451, 130 N.E. 727 (1921) ; Stromberg Motor Device Company v. Industrial
Commission 305 Ill. 619, 137 N.E. 462 (1922). See also Andrews v. Gross
and Janes Tie Company, 214 Ark. 210, 216 S.W. 2d 386 (1949), Wherein
the court held that the commonly stated 'rule is that:
The award in compensation proceedings has the force and effect of the
verdict of a jury. Being in the nature of a judgment, it finally and
conclusively determines the rights of the parties under the workmen's
compensation acts unless set aside in a proper manner, and is as
bin ing as a judgment of a court entitled to the same faith and credit
as such a judgment.
Id., 214 Ark. at 212, 216 S.W. 2d at 388. However, revision of awards are
often allowed by statute on the theory that the individual hardship often outweighs the added expense of re-examination and the desire to rely on the
final judgment. Consult N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, §123 (McKinne 1965).
While the courts generally hesitate to apply the doctrine of res judicata
to administrative determinations which were not subjected to judicial review in a court of law, there is less reluctance in applying this doctrine to
agency determinations which have been passed through such review. This
distinction is predicated upon the theory that the barring effect attaches to
the decision of the court of law rather than that of the order of the administrative agency See e.g., City of Jackson v. Holliday, 246 Miss. 412 149
So. 2d 525 (1963), Woodlawn Area Citizens Ass'n v. Board of County Commissioners, 241 Md. 187 216 A. 2d 149 (1965). The Illinois court in the case
under consideration refused to apply this distinction relying on the case of
222 East Chestnut Street v. 199 Lake Shore Drive, Inc., 24 Ill. App. 2d 545,
1
165 N.E. 2d 71 (1960).
It has consistently been held that a former adjudication does not rest
on the opinion of the court of review, but on the judgment of the trial
court which has become final through affirmance.
Id., 241 Ill. App. 2d at 550, 165 N.E. 2d at 73. Thus, the court in Citizens
Savings and Loan reasoned that if the initial determination at the agency
level was not subject to the binding effect of res judicata, subsequent judicial review of such an agency determination could not change its character
in this respect.
88 195 N.C. 793, 143 S.E. 827 (1928).
39 See also Hollywood Circle, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage
Control, 55 Cal. 2d 728, 361 P. 2d 712 (1961) ; Cardinal Bus Lines v. Consolidated Coach Corp., 254 Ky. 586, 72 S.W. 2d 7 (1934) ; Watkins v. Mississippi
State Board of Pharmacy, 170 Miss. 26, 154 So. 277 (1934) ; Polsky v. Atkins,
197 Tenn.
201, 270 S.W. 2d 479 (1954).
' 0 See, e.g. Bockman v. Arkansas State Medical Board, .299 Ark. 143,
313 S.W. 2d 82d (1958); Aylward v. State Board of Chiropractic Examiners,
31 Cal. 2d 833, 192 P. 2d 929 (1948).
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The doctrine of res judicata in the administrative area, just
as in the courts, has no application where there is a change of
circumstances. It has been recognized, thus, that a change of
physical conditions or an allegation of new facts, not in existence at the time of the prior ruling, permits licensing of a previously unsuccessful applicant. 41 In the zoning field the courts
have point out that caution must be used in applying res judicata in areas where there might be a change of circumstances.' 2 Consequently, where there has been a substantial
change in facts, the petitioner should be granted a rehearing.43
Under the same circumstances, but with the additional
presence of a strong public interest factor, the doctrine of res judicata has no application. Thus, a wholesale liquor license of a
chain grocery store was held to have been properly revoked on
substantially the same grounds which were present when the license was previously renewed. 44 Similarly, a corporation which
sold natural gas to industrial concerns was properly subject to reexamination to determine whether it was a public utility corporation despite a previous ruling by the agency to the contrary.' 5 In each of the foregoing cases the overriding social and
economic public interest affected by the administrative determination transcended the values of finality and stability which are
implemented by the res judicata doctrine.
Licensing, more than other areas, involves the public interest. It does not merely center upon adjusting the rights and
duties existing between private individuals, but it involves adjusting the rights and balancing the interests between the licensee and the public to the extent that the public is affected by
the activity of the licensee. Moreover, the private interest is out41 See, e.g., Matthews v. State ex rel. St. Andrews Bay Transportation
Co., 111 Fla. 587, 149 So. 648 (1933). See also Comment, 65 HARv. L. REV.
820, 867 (1952).
42 See City of Miami Beach v. Parking Facilities, Fla. App. 120 So. 2d
209, 210 (1960).
43 Fiorilla v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Norwalk, 144 Conn. 275, 129
A. 2d 619 (1957); Russell v. Board of Adjustment, 31 N.J. 58, 155 A. 2d 83
(1959). See also North American Holding Corporation v. Murdock, 9 Misc.
2d 632. 167 N.Y.S. 2d 120, appeal dismissed 6 App. Div. 2d 596, 180 N.Y.S. 2d

436 (1958).
44 Louis Stores v. Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 57 Cal. 2d 749,

758, 371 P. 2d 758, 762 (1962)
In the present case both of these factors: i.e., public interest and effect
upon third persons, strongly indicate that the prior determination of the
board should not operate to preclude either the department or the courts
from re-examining the statute and applying the correct interpretation.
45 Mississippi River Fuel Corporation v. Commerce Commission, 1 Ill.
2d 509, 513, 116 N.E. 2d 394, 396 (1954).
The concept of public regulation includes of necessity the philosophy
that the commission shall have power to deal freely with each situation

as it comes before it, regardless of how it may have dealt with a similar
or even the same situation in a previous proceeding.
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weighed by the public interest because there is "little likelihood of
substantial reliance by those who opposed the petition, their only
46
detriment being the expense of relitigation.1
Thus in the case of Louis Stores, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage ControlJ4 the court affirmed the decision of the
agency in revoking a wholesale liquor license on the grounds that
the licensee had failed to make sales to retail licensees other than
himself. In a prior decision involving the same licensee the
agency refused to revoke the license although the same practice
of selling only to himself was considered. The agency stated in
its prior proceeding that such action "has presented no problem
which is contrary to public welfare and morals. ' ' 41 The court in
upholding the agency's revocation in the subsequent proceeding
stated that such use of the wholesale license "will be contrary to
public welfare in that Louis Stores will thus secure the right to
maintain an unfair competitive advantage... . -,9 The court concerned itself, although not expressly, with the public interest in
regulating the effect of the licensee's wholesale liquor business on
the community welfare. Similarly, it would appear that if the
agency has made a mistake in applying the law or has applied
the wrong law, they are not bound by such a mistake but are, in
light of the public interest involved in the proceeding, free to
re-examine and correct such errors. 50
In the Citizens Savings and Loan Association case the Illinois Court was faced with the applicability of the doctrine of
res judicata to the area of licensing. The cases cited by the
court in Citizens Savings and Loan Association made statements
that appear to support the view that the res judicata doctrine
has little application in administrative proceedings. In the
Illinois Power and Light Corporation case the court stated that
the commission was not a judicial tribunal and, therefore, its
orders were not judgments.1 Such language would seem to indicate that the court was rejecting the application of res judicata on the grounds that the action of the agency was not the exercise of a judicial function. But while the court made such statements about the application of res judicata doctrine, it was concerned with the grant of a certificate of convenience and necessity, which by its very nature demands strong examination of
Comment, 65 HARV. L. REV. 820, 866 (1952).
47 57 Cal. 2d 749, 371 P. 2d 758 (1962).
48 Id., 57 Cal. 2d at 755, 371 P. 2d at 761.
49 Id., 57 Cal. 2d at 758, 371 P. 2d at 762.
50 See, e.g., In re Whitford's Liquor License, 166 Pa. Supp. 48, 70 A.
2d 708 (1950).
46

51 See text at note 6, 8upra.
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public interest, and thus the court might have considered this
52
aspect in allowing re-evaluation.
In the Mississippi River Fuel Corporation case, the court
did focus upon the public interest factor involved in the regulation of the appellant's business observing that: "The concept of
public regulation included, of necessity, the philosophy that the
commission shall have power to deal freely . . ."5

While the

courts have in the cases cited rejected the applicability of res
judicata in broad general language indicating that the agencies
in question were not functioning in a quasi-judicial manner, the
tacit basis for rejecting the doctrine can be related to the strong
underlying public interest considerations.
In Daley v. License Appeal Commission, " apparently the
only significant decision on res judicata in the licensing field in
Illinois, the court cited and followed the Illinois Power and Light
Corporationand the Mississippi River Fuel Corp. cases in holding that res judicata would not apply. 55 Again the court in its
opinion failed to commit itself to an analysis of the action of the
agency. In light of decisions involving similar agencies in other
jurisdictions 5 the court might have found that the agency was
exercising a judicial function, but that its decision was nevertheless justified in terms of the public interest involved.5 7
"The extension of the doctrine of res judicata from that of
purely judicial proceedings into the field of administrative law
52 See Mulcahy v. Public Service Commission, 101 Utah 245, 117 P. 2d
298 (1941). In discussing the concept of convenience and necessity, the
court said: "The 'convenience' and 'necessity' required to support an application of a certificate are those of the public not those of individuals." Id.,
101 Utah at 250, 117 P. 2d at 300.
53 1 Ill. 2d 509, 513, 116 N.E. 2d 394, 396 (1953).
See also Stratton v,
Railroad Commission of California, 186 Cal. 119, 198 Pac. 1051 (1921).
54 55 Ill. App. 2d 474, 205 N.E. 2d 269 (1965).
55 See text at note 10, supra.
56 See Louis Stores, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control,
57 Cal. 2d 749, 371 P. 2d 758 (1962) ; Hollywood Circle, Inc. v. Department
of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 55 Cal. 2d 728, 361 P. 2d 712 (1961) ; Polsky
v. Atkins, 197 Tenn. 201, 270 S.W. 2d 479 (1954).
57 The Illinois Court in Daley, in holding that a liquor license applicant,
rejected because of bad moral character, might later re-apply, without being
barred by the doctrine of res judicata, indicated that the mere passage of
time would present to the commission a new situation which might be reexamined, stating,
The court's prior judgment, having been based on a different record
would not be res judicata of the issue raised in the new cause of action:
Burnette's [the applicant's] fitness to have license as of the date of his
second application.
55 Ill. App. 2d at 478, 205 N.E. 2d at 277. Such language would seem to indicate that the passage of time would be considered a change in circumstances, thus demanding a re-examination.
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has been anything but uniform in the various states."58 Although the court in Citizens Savings and Loan Association recognized this, it did little to clarify the problem. It raised generally: (1) the trifold and distinct nature of administrative
agencies; (2) that there was a change of circumstances in the
case since its prior adjudication; and (3) that there was a
strong and overriding public interest in the area of savings and
loan institutions. "Based upon [all] the foregoing observations
[the Court was] of the firm belief that the doctrine of res judi-

cata [was] not applicable.

...

59

While the court probably reached a proper decision, it failed
to specify which and to what extent each of the foregoing considerations was dispositive in determining whether to apply the
doctrine of res judicata to the administrative proceeding. The
opinion, therefore, has limited value as an analytic tool to guide
the practitioner and future courts in this area. It is unclear
from the facts of the case whether the agency was acting in a
ministerial capacity or in a judicial capacity. Under the test set
out in the Prentis case6 ° it would be ministerial,1 while under
Harden62 it would be judicial.6 8 Nevertheless, even if the agency
was acting in a judicial capacity, its rejection of the applicability
of the res judicata doctrine may still be justified because of the
changed circumstances existing at the time of the petitioner's
re-application. Further, since the case involved the granting of
a license, a strong element of public interest was present.6 4 A
clear statement to this effect by the court would do much to
eliminate the confusion resulting from its bland assertion that
res judicata does not apply to administrative agencies in Illinois.
Charles H. May
58

74 Ill. App. 2d 339, 219 N.E. 2d 358.

59 Id., 74 Ill.
App. 2d at 243, 219 N.E. 2d at 359.

211 U.S. 210 (1908).
a See text at notes 25-27 supra. The Court in Citizen's Savings and
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Loan Association seems to indicate that they would follow the Prentis test

for determining quasi-judicial functions. "[Wihere the administrative agency
is not a party to the proceedings and those involving conflicting claims of
parties coming before it," the action may be referred to as quasi-judicial.
74 Ill. App. 2d at 239, 219 N.E. 2d at 358. However, the court fails to make
use of this test in concluding that res judicata does not apply to administra-

tive orders.
62 192 N.C. 395, 135 S.E. 151 (1926).
63 See text at note 24, supra. In giving approval and a permit to organize a savings and loan association, the Commissioner exercises certain
judicial-like discretion in applying the prescribed law. ILL. REV. STAT.

(1965), ch. 32, §724.
64 See text at notes 44-46, 8up7a.

